In 19711 wrote a paper attempting to relate some old philosophical issues about representation and reasoning to problems in Artificial Intelligence.
A major theme of the paper was the importance of distinguishing "analogical" from "Fregean" representations.
I still think the distinction is important, though perhaps not as important for current problems in A.I. as I used to think. In this paper I'll try to explain why.
Throughout
I'll use the term "representation" to refer to a more or less complex structure which has addressable and significant parts, and which as a whole is used to denote or refer to something else. Thus maps, sentences, and phrases like "The paternal grandfather of the present mayor of Brighton" are representations.
There is much that's puzzling and complex about the concept of using something to "denote" or "refer to " something else, but for the present I'll dodge that issue and rely on our intuitive understanding thereof. Secondly I wrote as though anyone using a Fregean language, like predicate calculus, would not be interested in ~ the sets of assertions describing some world or problem.
(Minsky and Papert make the same mistake.) However, intelligent programmers do not devise theorem-provers which blindly store all axioms in whatever order they are read in, and always have to search the whole lot in order to find assertions relevant to any particular sub-problem or sub-goal.
If the set of stored assertions is large it will obviously pay to have some kind of indexing scheme, or to store assertions in a network such that each one is associated with pointers to others which might possibly be relevant.
In fact, Bob Kowalski has shown that one can intimately combine the indexing system with a "resolution" inference system so that making inferences by resolution becomes a process of modifying the index to the data-base of axioms. However, no resolution theorem-prover, to my knoweldge,
gives the user sufficient access 
